2026-10-06T07:27:24Z https://api.figshare.com/v2/oai

oai:figshare.com:article/34055046 2026-10-02T07:20:59Z category_27682 item_type_3 month_year_10_2026

replication files for "Bullying to Settlement" s h (14288306) International relations Territorial dispute bargaining strategies bullying dispute resolution <p dir="ltr">Why do some border claims terminate while others persist? To answer this question, we focus on how bargaining strategies furnish information to disputing states, thereby shaping the likelihood of resolution. We theorize that the adoption of a coercive bullying strategy by at least one disputant will escalate the territorial dispute, a dynamic which in turn reveals critical strategic information about the disputants’ capabilities, resolve, and the costs of escalation. These revelations foster mutual recognition and make claim resolution more likely. Conversely, the absence of bullying corresponds to tension de-escalation but yields limited information. Consequently, these conditions decrease the likelihood of claim resolution. Empirical analyses using an original dataset of bullying behavior during crises over border claims in the 1918–2001 period support the expectation that the use of a bullying strategy by one or both disputants translates into more rapid claim settlement, with settlement terms that may reflect battlefield outcomes.</p> 2026-10-02T07:20:59Z Dataset Dataset 10.6084/m9.figshare.34055046.v1 https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/replication_files_for_Bullying_to_Settlement_/34055046 CC BY 4.0