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          <dc:title>The hidden costs of carbon commodification : emissions trading, political legitimacy and procedural justice</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Edward Page (23819164)</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Climatic changes -- Law and legislation</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Emissions trading -- Law and legislation</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>International organization</dc:subject>
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          <dc:description>A growing body literature is devoted to the evaluation of rival global governance responses designed to manage the risks posed by climate change. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, and the Copenhagen Accord ‘noted’ by the UNFCCC, have all been criticised on grounds of environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, and distributive justice. The policy responses systematised by these climate change agreements, in particular the emissions trading mechanisms introduced by the Kyoto Protocol and European Union, have also attracted criticism on similar grounds. A neglected line of research, however, has been how global climate governance institutions and policies fare in terms of normative ideals the significance of which is not captured without remainder by commonly held objectives of improving environmental quality, at least economic cost, and with minimal worsening of existing global inequalities. Two such ‘non-distributive’ ideals are those of political legitimacy and procedural justice. In this article, I explore some of the features of emissions trading schemes that place it in tension with norms of political legitimacy and procedural justice. I argue that serious doubts arise as to the normative justification of climate responses with emissions trading at their core.</dc:description>
          <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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          <dc:identifier>10.1080/13510347.2012.709689</dc:identifier>
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