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        <datestamp>2026-09-28T04:23:06Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Supplementary file 1_A stochastic differential game between two hybrid pension fund managers under a jump-diffusion liability process.pdf</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Oteng Keganneng (25119153)</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Eriyoti Chikodza (25119156)</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Othusitse Basimanebotlhe (25119159)</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Applied Mathematics not elsewhere classified</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>jump-diffusion</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>liability</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Nash equilibrium</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>pension fund</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>stochastic differential game</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>Background&lt;p&gt;Hybrid defined contribution (DC) pension funds, combining fixed contributions with stochastic liability dynamics, face competitive pressures when members reallocate contributions to higher-performing funds.&lt;/p&gt;Methods&lt;p&gt;We model two competing hybrid DC pension fund managers in a stochastic differential game. Liability risk is modelled as a jump-diffusion process with truncated exponential jump amplitudes, using the exact asset-to-liability ratio formulation. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman dynamic programming approach yields Nash equilibrium portfolio strategies and value functions in closed form.&lt;/p&gt;Results&lt;p&gt;The Nash equilibrium portfolio weights are independent of liability jump parameters. In the symmetric liability-correlation case, they reduce to K = (μ−r)/σ&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;, independent of both managers' risk aversion. In the asymmetric case, risk aversion enters through a cross-liability correction term. Competition strictly amplifies risk-taking relative to the single-agent benchmark. Liability jumps significantly affect welfare: a manager's own jumps reduce welfare while the competitor's jumps improve it.&lt;/p&gt;Discussion&lt;p&gt;These results extend Nash equilibrium analysis for DC pension funds to jump-diffusion liabilities, showing that while jump parameters do not alter equilibrium portfolio strategies, they materially affect welfare through two loading functions capturing own-jump welfare costs and cross-player spillovers. Numerical illustrations confirm all theoretical predictions.&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description>
          <dc:date>2026-09-28T04:23:06Z</dc:date>
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          <dc:identifier>10.3389/fams.2026.1931310.s001</dc:identifier>
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          <dc:rights>CC BY 4.0</dc:rights>
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