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        <identifier>oai:figshare.com:article/34001031</identifier>
        <datestamp>2026-09-25T18:57:19Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>The Maturity Structure of Green Subsidies:}\\</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>博 王 (25111908)</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Cross-sectional analysis</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>green subsidy policies</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;Should governments concentrate green subsidies at project launch, or reserve&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;funds for later investment? This choice is consequential when success depends&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;on complementary projects. In Chinese firm data, fewer firms receive&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;innovation subsidies five years after entry, yet average awards, including&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;zeros, are larger. We study this timing puzzle in a model where firms invest,&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;learn, and expand under uncertainty about collective success. Because later&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;support rewards the firm's final position, it also raises the return to&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;establishing an installed base today. A planner maximizing transition&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;capacity therefore funds both stages but allocates a larger share to later&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;support. When costs and aggregate influence differ across firms, these&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;characteristics shape total allocations but leave optimal timing shares&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;unchanged. Credible future support can thus mobilize investment today.&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description>
          <dc:date>2026-09-25T18:57:19Z</dc:date>
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          <dc:identifier>10.6084/m9.figshare.34001031.v1</dc:identifier>
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          <dc:rights>CC BY 4.0</dc:rights>
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