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        <identifier>oai:figshare.com:article/33978310</identifier>
        <datestamp>2026-09-24T02:03:17Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>The Effects of Program Information on Citizens’ Reputational Beliefs about Government and Health Insurance Enrollment: Evidence from a Field Experiment</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Qun Wang (25090547)</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Public administration</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>program information</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>bureaucratic reputation</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>reputational beliefs</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>health insurance enrollment</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>field experiment</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;Research on program information has largely focused on program-directed consequences, leaving less understood whether such information also generates government-directed reputational consequences. Drawing on a cluster-randomized field experiment involving a government-embedded complementary health insurance program in China, this study examines the effects of program information on citizens’reputational beliefs about government and health insurance enrollment. We find that a bundled program information intervention leads to more favorable reputational beliefs about government. The intervention also increases enrollment willingness, although the evidence is weaker under exact randomization inference, while its positive estimated effect on actual enrollment is not statistically significant. More favorable reputational beliefs about government are also positively associated with both enrollment willingness and actual enrollment. These findings show that program information can have consequences for both government evaluations and program responses, although the strength of evidence varies across enrollment outcomes. The study extends the emerging micro-level perspective on bureaucratic reputation by showing that the informational foundations of reputational belief formation extend beyond explicitly reputation-oriented communication to substantive information about public programs.&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description>
          <dc:date>2026-09-24T02:03:17Z</dc:date>
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          <dc:identifier>10.6084/m9.figshare.33978310.v1</dc:identifier>
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