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        <datestamp>2026-09-18T19:18:21Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Green Transition of Agricultural Supply Chains under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Impacts and Responses</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>hansheng wu (17000088)</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Agricultural economics</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>agricultural supply chain</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>green transition</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>stochastic evolutionary game</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>system dynamics</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;The European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) creates new pressures for global agricultural supply chains. This study develops a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game involving an exporting country's agricultural supply chain, its government, and the EU regulator. Drawing on factor endowment theory and customs union theory, the model introduces Gaussian white noise to represent uncertainty arising from carbon-price volatility and agricultural production risk. It then usesstochastic differential equations to derive the evolutionarily stable strategies and the conditions under which they arise. We calibrate the model with a 2013-2023 panel of China's agricultural exports to the EU. An augmented gravity model estimates the marginal trade effect of environmental regulation, while system-dynamics simulations trace how the main parameters shape strategy selection. The results show that the system can reach the preferred stable state, although stochastic shocks alter both convergence speed and stability. The agricultural supply chain is the most sensitive of the three actors to external uncertainty. Compliance costs display a threshold effect, making lower institutional transaction costs more consequential than production subsidies alone. Strict EU verification and incentives from the exporting-country government are complementary: strong external regulation promotes transition only when paired with domestic cost sharing. We therefore propose a low-cost compliance system, targeted dynamic incentives, risk-buffering arrangements, and stronger cross-border regulatory cooperation.&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description>
          <dc:date>2026-09-18T19:18:21Z</dc:date>
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          <dc:identifier>10.6084/m9.figshare.33940717.v1</dc:identifier>
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          <dc:rights>CC BY 4.0</dc:rights>
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