2026-10-13T20:20:54Z https://api.figshare.com/v2/oai

oai:figshare.com:article/33829645 2026-09-16T07:04:57Z category_25501 item_type_3 month_year_09_2026

<b>Coordinating AI Adoption and Workforce Skill Investment: Policy Allocation under Technology–Skill Complementarity</b> Ruihui Yu (22669087) Production and operations management AI-enabled production technology–skill complementarity complementary production inputs production bottlenecks Stackelberg–Nash game <p dir="ltr">This paper investigates how policy support should be allocated between AI technology and workforce skills in production systems. We develop a two-stage Stackelberg–Nash game involving the government, firms, and employees, in which AI adoption and skill investment are determined endogenously. Equilibrium analysis, state-dependent policy comparisons, and numerical simulations reveal four key mechanisms. First, skill investment raises the marginal return to AI adoption, and this effect strengthens with technology–skill complementarity. Second, the relative effectiveness of technology subsidies and training support depends on the binding production constraint: as complementarity strengthens, policy emphasis shifts from AI adoption towards skill development. Third, when AI diffusion outpaces workforce adaptation, complementarity can erode, weakening the contribution of skills to AI-enabled productivity. Fourth, as AI matures, the effectiveness of direct technology support declines, whereas training support follows a non-monotonic pattern. These findings provide implications for coordinating AI investment and workforce-development policies to support sustainable AI-enabled production.</p> 2026-09-16T07:04:57Z Dataset Dataset 10.6084/m9.figshare.33829645.v1 https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/_b_Coordinating_AI_Adoption_and_Workforce_Skill_Investment_Policy_Allocation_under_Technology_Skill_Complementarity_b_/33829645 CC BY 4.0