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        <datestamp>2026-09-15T15:19:57Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Data for Traveling agents : political change and bureaucratic turnover in India</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Lakshmi Iyer (12408482)</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Anandi Mani (16241309)</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Bureaucracy -- India</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Civil service -- India</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>India -- Politics and government -- 21st century</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Political science -- India</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Migrated from ePrints</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>We develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns, and the consequent implications for bureaucrats' career investments. Unique micro-level data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of varying importance to control bureaucrats. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts. We find evidence of two alternative paths to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill, but caste affinity to the politician's party base also helps secure important positions.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Data record consists of 34 data files, in .do, .out and .tab format, and a readme file. All data files are in Stata version 11. Do-files run in Stata version 10. The do-file IyerMani_Bureaucrats_filecreate.do creates the files needed to run regressions for each table. Data sources for all variables are described in Section 4 of the paper. Note that bureaucrat names have been anonymized; the field “identifier” provides a unique author-generated ID for each officer. All key variables have been labeled within each stata data file. The do-file IyerMani_Bureaucrats.do generates the results used in the paper. The readme describes the data files needed to generate the results in each table, and the file where the output is stored in a form easily read by Excel.</dc:description>
          <dc:date>2013-01-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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          <dc:rights>CC BY 4.0</dc:rights>
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