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        <datestamp>2026-09-14T14:48:42Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>&lt;b&gt;Captured Oversight and the Answerability–Enforcement Gap: Evidence from a Quarter-Century of Legislative Investigations in Nigeria&lt;/b&gt;</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Jake Dabang Dan-Azumi (24886444)</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Other law and legal studies not elsewhere classified</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>legislative oversight</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>horizontal accountability</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>anti-corruption</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>National Assembly</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Nigeria</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;Jake Dabang Dan-Azumi studies how legislatures in new democracies actually work, and the gap between their institutional form and their function. Working chiefly on the National Assembly of Nigeria across the Fourth Republic, he builds original, population-level datasets from the institutional documentary record, the votes and proceedings, committee reports and order papers, to measure what a legislature does rather than what its formal powers suggest it should. His empirical work spans legislative oversight and investigations, the fate of non-binding resolutions, presidential assent and the veto, bill gestation and passage, and legislative agenda-setting, and it increasingly sets the Nigerian case in comparative perspective against other presidential and parliamentary systems. A recurring theme is the decoupling of answerability from enforcement: the ways in which visible legislative activity can substitute for, rather than deliver, accountability.&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description>
          <dc:date>2026-09-14T14:48:42Z</dc:date>
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